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The Price of Passion: The Banishment of
English Hooligans from Football Matches
in Violation of Fundamental Freedoms
BY GEOFF BECKHAM*
Introduction
International football is the world's most popular team sport.'
The first recorded football game took place in Derby, England, in
A.D. 217, at a celebration of victory over Roman soldiers The game
developed over centuries, its legacy eventually spreading to the
United States where it is more commonly referred to as soccer. Every
four years, the World Cup celebrates the glory of international
football competition in a month-long tournament of champions.
Participants endure two grueling years of qualification matches
against regional nemeses. The victor is revered as the world's
greatest football-playing nation.
However, as often as the football community exults in worldwide
camaraderie, its image is repeatedly scarred by the inexplicably
violent behavior of its supporters.
I. The Hooligan Epidemic
An indescribable hysteria surrounds football, stigmatized by a
particular form of violence termed "hooliganism." Ultimately,
hooligans are passionate fans. Violent encounters often arise when
hordes of fans travel over large distances to support their local
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002;
B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1998.
1. Soccer, in THE COLUMBIA ELECrRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), at
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football club where they are met by equally fervent rivals. Whereas
competing loyalties once clashed only in cheers and songs echoing
throughout the stadium, police now combat street-wide brawls that
cause harm to people and property.4
The unfortunate catastrophe of football-related violence is
scattered across all continents, but the greatest intensity of reproach
undoubtedly falls upon English fans. England achieved its
undesirable notoriety in 1985, when its fans were blamed for rioting at
a European Cup Championship5 in Belgium that left thirty-eight
spectators dead. While conducting further investigations, Federation
Internationale de Football Association7 (FIFA) levied the harshest
available penalty on English clubs.8 The governing body assessed a
"death penalty" on English soccer, a worldwide ban from all
competitions, lasting for an indefinite term.9 FIFA eventually relaxed
the punishment, limiting the ban to all European competitions."0
Today, the violence persists, and measures must be taken to combat
hooliganism as the threat to public safety continues to grow." English
authorities say police are bracing themselves for encounters with "a
new breed of 'intelligent' football hooligan-sophisticated and with
the ability to organise trouble away from the glare of publicity, using
the Internet and mobile phones."' 2  These sophisticated criminals
serve to complicate the development of effective policing strategies.
Authorities speculate that professionals become involved because
they find their work mundane and desperately desire a method of
4. Michael Smith, Soccer Thugs Kick Off for 'the Most Violent Season in Years,'
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 14,2000, at 4.
5. The European Cup is a quadrennial competition amongst all football nations
of Europe. The tournament is staggered against the more prestigious World Cup
competition (i.e. one of the competitions occurs every two years). The European
Cup is referred to as Euro [year], e.g. Euro 1996, Euro 2000.
6. Football: Decisive Day for Liverpool as Appeal Is Heard by UEFA, TIMES
(London), Aug. 8, 1985 [hereinafter Football: Decisive Day].
7. International football competition is regulated by the F6d6ration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), which was founded in 1904. FIFA
sponsors the quadrennial World Cup competition; its membership is larger than that
of the United Nations. Soccer, supra note 1.
8. Football: Decisive Day, supra note 6.
9. Russell Thomas, English Clubs Given Friendly Reprieve / International
Football Federation Ban Partially Lifted, GUARDIAN (London), July 12, 1985.
10. Id.
11. Wolves Fans Top Table of Shame, SUNDAY MERCURY, Aug. 13,2000, at 13.
12. Id.
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expressing their aggression.13
The hooligan reputation impacts the United Kingdom in a
multitude of ways. 4  "It is one of the ironies of modem English
football that-both politically and financially-more rides on the
behaviour of the fans than on the performance of the players.' 5 In
response to the violent reputation of English supporters on the
international football scene, governmental officials realized that
existing legislation was insufficient to quash the ever-present
violence. In 1989, Parliament enacted legislation aimed at
eliminating the threat to public safety caused by hooligan activity. 7
Despite the legitimacy of public safety concerns, the arbitrary
enforcement of the legislation is a concern. 8 Furthermore, recently
enacted measures proactively pursue hooligans to a degree that
violates fundamental concepts of civil liberty.
II. English Domestic Law
A. Football Spectators Act 1989
The Football Spectators Act 1989 (Football Act) is the original
body of public safety legislation governing disciplinary and criminal
proceedings brought against hooligans." The purpose of the Football
Act was to prevent violence and disorder at or in designated football
matches. 2 The statute sought to control "the admission of spectators
at designated football matches in England and Wales by means of a
national membership scheme., 21 The national membership scheme
licensed spectators, creating a database that allowed the police to
regulate attendance at sporting events.' Full implementation of the
membership scheme stalled as a result of the staggering expense
13. Id.
14. See Jonathan Ames, World Cup-Legal Means to Restrict UK Fans, LAW
SociETY's GAZETrE, May 30, 1990, at 6.
15. Id.
16. See Edward Grayson, Sentencing Soccer Hooligans, 140 NEw L.J. 831, 831
(1990).
17. Football Spectators Act 1989, c. 37 (Eng.) [hereinafter Football Act].
18. See Claire Graham, Football 'Thugs' in Matches Ban, DERBY EVENING
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 3, 2000, at 3.
19. Football Act, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ames, supra note 14, at 6.
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required to maintain the extensive network.'
The notion of a national membership scheme survived, in part,
through the discretionary power of the courts to photograph the
recipients of exclusion orders.' However, the reactive nature of the
membership scheme proved futile in combating the increasingly
violent activity of football supporters both inside and outside
stadiums.' Subsequently, two amendments, the Football (Offences
and Disorder) Act 1999 and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, revised
and reinforced the Football Act.26
1. Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999
The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 established
"banning orders" for domestic and international matches. A
banning order is a court-ordered mandate which "prohibits the
person who is subject to the order from entering any premise for the
purpose of attending such matches."' ' In order to prohibit attendance
at football matches occurring outside England or Wales, that person
must report to a local police station during the relevant "control
period., 29  The control period commences five days before the
beginning of the match, and ends when the match is finished or
cancelled.' During the control period, the suspect must surrender his
passport, neutralizing his ability to travel to the foreign site of the
English football match?1 Depending on the manner in which banning
orders are imposed, the court's restrictive mandate lasts no more than
ten years, and no fewer than two.32 Subsequent legislation provided
teeth to this already prohibitive initiative.
23. Id.
24. John Marston, Exclusion Orders Under the Public Order Act 1986, LAW
SOcIETY'S GAZETtE, Sept. 2, 1987, at 2426.
25. Sporting Violence, 139 NEW L.J. 1621, 1621 (1989).
26. Author's note to clear up any confusion: the new legislation passed in 1999
and 2000 can be referenced as, for instance, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, or as
the "amended" Football Spectators Act 1989 (effective August 28, 2000). Although
textual references in this Note may be made to the subsequent amendments,
whenever possible, citations will be directly to the Football Spectators Act 1989.
27. Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999, c. 21, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.).




32. Id. § 14F.
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2. Football (Disorder) Act 2000
In anticipation of Euro 2000, Home Secretary Jack Straw rushed
the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (2000 Act) through Parliament.33
The 2000 Act implemented a number of significant changes to the
existing legislation.' Ultimately the amendment established a more
proactive scheme for combating hooliganism. 5 Bryan Drew, Head of
Strategic and Specialist Intelligence at the National Criminal
Intelligence Service, praised the 2000 Act as legislation that "has real
teeth and, rigorously applied, will go a long way to further squeeze
the criminal element out of support for our national game.
36
Prior to August 28, 2000, the Football Act empowered
authorities to impose domestic or international banning orders only
upon individuals who had been convicted of football-related
offences.37 Crimes involving international fixtures resulted in a ban
from games abroad, while domestic altercations only affected
attendance at matches in England and Wales3 Following the
enactment of the 2000 Act, however, each exclusion order now results
in a domestic and international ban.39 Consequently, even if the
conduct occurred during a domestic match, the statute mandates the
surrender of an individual's passport during all control periods."
The recent amendment also greatly expands the use of banning
orders. Under the Football Act, a banning order was employed
following conviction for a "relative" offence if it would "help to
prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated
football matches."'" The current effect of a banning order remains
the same: to prohibit attendance at domestic or international football
matches. However, the 2000 Act greatly increases the array of
33. Sydney Young, Thug Gets Foreign Ban, MIRROR (London), Aug. 31, 2000, at
7; see Football (Disorder) Act 2000, c. 25 (Eng.) [hereinafter 2000 Act].
34. The 2000 Act amended §14 of the Football Act. Section 14 (Banning Orders)
gives rise to the most intrusive measures of the Football Act and therefore constitutes
the focus of this note.
35. Vivek Chaudhary, New Clamp on Football Hooligans, GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 28,2000, at 8.




39. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14(2)-(4)(b).
40. Football Legislation Receives Royal Assent, HERMES DATABASE: HoME
OFFIcE, July 28,2000.
41. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14A(1), (2).
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"relevant offences" for which exclusion applies, including conduct not
immediately connected to football, such as transit to and from the
game.2
The original Football Act focused on punishing those who
contributed directly to football-related offences. The significant
expansion of the Football Act's scope through the 2000 Act was
criticized as being unnecessarily broad.4 '3 However, as long as the
banning order is in response to the conviction of a crime of violence
or disorder, such an augmentation of banning orders apparently
remains consistent with the stated principles of public policy.
Hooliganism is a national epidemic, and contribution to the violence
may come from unexpected culprits. However, the 2000 Act may
have taken the general distaste for football-related violence too far.
C. Banning Orders Made on a Complaint
The Football Act aggrandized police enforcement power,
allowing the issuance of a notice to appear before a magistrate for a
banning order absent an accompanying conviction on a football-
related offence. ' This procedure, termed "banning orders made on a
complaint," violates reasonable expectations of civil liberty.4 The
Football Act, as revised by the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act
1999 and the 2000 Act, enables courts to impose banning orders
against individuals who have never been convicted of a football-
related offence.' Local authorities can apply for a banning order
based on a complaint against a suspect if it appears to the officer that
the respondent has "at any time caused or contributed to any violence
or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere." 47 Furthermore, the
Act permits police to detain that person for up to four hours
(extendable up to six hours with the authorization of an Inspector)
while making the requisite inquiries.' The magistrate may not take
into account any of the suspect's conduct occurring more than ten
42. Id. § 14.
43. See Alun Rees, First Yob Banned Under New Crackdown on Football Thugs,
EXPRESS (London), Aug. 31, 2000.
44. Football Legislation Receives Royal Assent, supra note 40; see also Jenny
Mackenzie, Mike Backs Law to Tackle the Football Hooligans, COVENTRY EVENING
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Aug. 30,2000, at 7.
45. Graham, supra note 18, at 3.
46. Rees, supra note 43.
47. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14B(1), (2).
48. Football Legislation Receives Royal Assent, supra note 40.
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years before the application for the banning order.49
Herein lies a distinction integral to the legitimacy of the 2000
Act. While exclusion orders derived from conviction of a football-
related offence are substantiated by the accompanying criminal act,
banishment based solely on a complaint infringes upon certain
fundamental human rights and freedoms as established by the
European Union, and go far beyond what is necessary to prevent
disorder.'
I1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) sets forth a number of
fundamental rights and freedoms, enforced by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR).5' The majority of alleged violations are
heard before the court sitting in chamber of seven judges. The
ECHR decides on the admissibility and merit of applications and, if
necessary, undertakes an investigation of potentially legitimate
allegations.53 More serious accusations may be referred directly to the
Grand Chamber, which is the highest authority of the ECHR.'4
Whether the ECHR is sitting in original jurisdiction or as an appellate
body, judgments arising therefrom are final.55  The Football Act
arguably is in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.
A. Article 7 of the Convention
The United Kingdom ratified the Convention on August 3,
1951.56 Two years later, the requisite number of European nations
49. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14C.
50. Graham, supra note 18, at 3.
51. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Htmil005.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001)
[hereinafter Convention].
52. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Summary, at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/summaries/html/005.htm (last visited




56. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COLLECTED TExTs 68 (1987).
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ratified the Convention, granting it the force of law.57 Article 7.1 of
the Convention states that:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence
under national or international law at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed
Fundamental rights are not protected without restraint. An
infringement upon certain fundamental rights and freedoms is
justified so long as it remains consistent with the European Union's
structure and objectives.5 9 The constraint of a fundamental right must
always be considered with regard to "the social function of the
protected activity."" The scope of Article 7's protection is limited
only by the court's interpretation of certain essential terms.
Protection is triggered if the petitioner of right incurred a substantive
increase in punishment levied upon a prior criminal offence.6'
B. The Act and Standards of Article 7
1. Hooliganism Is Criminal Conduct
Article 7.1 of the Convention prohibits the imposition of a
greater punishment for a previously committed criminal offence.62
Retrospective prohibitions linked to criminal offences receive
heightened scrutiny because criminal penalties threaten an
individual's freedom with impending imprisonment.'" Therefore, it is
necessary to determine whether acts associated with hooliganism
constitute criminal conduct. In Engel v. Netherlands, the ECHR
identified three criteria relevant to the classification of conduct as a
"criminal offence."6'"
It must first be ascertained whether "the provision(s) defining
the offence charged belong ... to criminal law, disciplinary law or
57. Id.
58. Convention, supra note 51, art. 7.1 (emphasis added).
59. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgeselischaft mbH v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R.
1125, 1130.
60. Id.
61. Convention, supra note 51, art. 7.1.
62. Id.
63. Tre Trakt6rer AB v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19, 46 (1989).
64. Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35, 82 (1976).
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both concurrently."'65 For the purpose of Article 7 of the Convention,
arrest alone is not sufficient to characterize conduct as criminal in
nature.'6 For instance, "[s]imple vagrancy is not an 'offence' under
Belgian law" because, although indigent defendants had been
arrested, "the magistrate did not find the applicants 'guilty' nor
impose a 'penalty' on them."67  Despite the court's conservative
definition of a criminal offence, hooliganism is distinguishable from
the passive disturbance associated with vagrancy and begging.
Hooliganism is a blanket term which encompasses many acts of
violence and public disorder, including, but not limited to, possession
of alcohol, weapons, or the use of threats or violence towards another
person or property at a football match.6s
The second factor, perhaps of greater importance, is the very
nature of the offence.69 The criminal nature of hooliganism is evident
when one considers an account of one hooligan, Terry Mann, who is a
super-fan of the English football club Newcastle United. Mann spent
thousands of dollars painting the United crest on his garage door, and
installed a stained-glass window with the emblem upon his front
door.70 Authorities connected Mann to several vicious altercations
that occurred both while he was attending matches and viewing
games at the pub.7' After receiving a complaint for returning to his
seat late after the beginning of the second half of a game, Mann
punched a man in the face, breaking his nose.' Following the brawl,
Mann appeared before Newcastle magistrates, charged with assault.
Under the 2000 Act,' the disorderly conduct resulted in revocation of
season tickets he had held for over twenty-seven years, and a three-
year banning order. 4 As Mann's behavior demonstrates, hooliganism
embodies the very nature of criminal conduct.
A third factor utilized to classify a "criminal offence" within the
Convention is the severity of the potential penalty.75 In Demicoli v.
65. Id.; Demicoli v. Malta, 210 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, 1I 32 (1991).
66. See, e.g., De Wilde v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44, 87 (1971).
67. Id.
68. Football Act, supra note 17, sched. 1.
69. Campbell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36, 71 (1984).
70. Brenda Hickman & Owen McAteer, Superfan is Kicked Out of Town,
EVENING CHRON. (Newcastle), Jan. 17,2001, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 2000 Act, supra note 33.
74. Hickman & McAteer, supra note 70, at 1.
75. Demicoli v. Malta, 210 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, j 34 (1991).
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Malta, the court held that a maximum punishment of sixty days in jail,
and an additional fine for defamatory libel, reached a degree of
punishment sufficient to classify an offence as "criminal., 76 As noted
above, there are a variety of acts of public disorder associated with
hooliganism. Many of these acts of misconduct are punishable by
imprisonment.' Furthermore, a person guilty of violating an imposed
banning order is subject to a term of imprisonment not to exceed six
months.7' While this potential sentence is not severe, it exceeds a
minimum standard of severity as established by Demicoli.79
General consideration of Engel's three-prong analysis indicates
that the hooligan activity prohibited by the Football Act is criminal in
nature, and therefore, within the protection of Article 7.
2. The Football Act Increases the Punishment for Prior Criminal
Conduct
European case law does not clearly delineate the magnitude of
"an increase in punishment" that is required to trigger the protection
of Article 7. Increased jail time would most certainly constitute an
increase in punishment; but the revocation of a person's passport,
thereby restricting his travel during the control period, may not.
In Tre Trakt~rer AB v. Sweden, the court concluded that the
revocation of a liquor license was a severe measure, but did not reach
the level of a penal sanction.' Intuitively, revocation of national
citizenship papers is more severe than the revocation of an
establishment's liquor license, as the former defines one's identity and
controls that person's fundamental freedom to travel.
However, such a distinction is not necessarily dispositive. The
analysis does not necessarily culminate with the finding that an
increased punishment has been levied. Even penal measures may
have retrospective effect where "the purpose to be achieved so
demands, and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned
are duly respected.",8' Thus, a further balancing analysis is required.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 91(1) (Eng.) (persons found drunk in
public places).
78. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14J.
79. See Demicoli, 210 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17, 34.
80. Tre Traktrer AB v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19, 46 (1989).
81. Case 99178, Decker v. Hauptzollamt Landau, 1979 E.C.R. 101, 110.
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a. Purpose of Statute
The Football Act is, above all else, public safety legislation. The
primary purpose of the Football Act is to prevent violence and
disorder at or in designated football matches.'
In addition to ensuring public order, however, the Football Act
was passed to safeguard England's economic well-being. English
football club involvement in foreign competitions often means
increased revenues and lucrative sponsorship deals, an integral part of
the English economy.' Banishment of English clubs from
international tournaments deprives the nation of substantial,
expected revenue.' Additionally, the resurgence of hooligan violence
undermined England's bid to host the World Cup in 2006.85 FIFA
President Sepp Blatter insisted that FIFA would not "look as if it is
rewarding England after what the thugs have done."' 6
Thus, legitimate and compelling interests played a part in
Parliament's decision to enact the Football Act and its subsequent
amendments. However, the proffered governmental interests must
be weighed against infringements upon the human rights of English
citizens.
b. Expectations of English Citizens
A primary policy concern in the application of criminal law is
that the general population be able to reasonably predict the
ramifications of their conductY Retrospective application of law
violates this principle of reasonable expectation of criminal
punishments. Banning orders made on a complaint supplement the
criminal penalty for prior acts, often after the suspect completed his
sentence of imprisonment or paid his fine. Consider the enforcement
of the Football Act against English citizens in the following cases.
Each account depicts a particular infringement upon the suspect's
civil liberties.
82. Football Act, supra note 17.
83. Brian McNaly, Football: Euro Thugs Cost Us Two Billion Pounds, SUNDAY




87. See Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1641,1626, T 26.
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i. Profiling
The first football hooligan to be banned from domestic and
international football matches under the new "get tough" legislation
of the 2000 Act was a twenty-one year-old warehouse worker from
Swindon.' In 1996, Chris Sawford was convicted of threatening
behavior.89 A year later, Sawford was arrested after a group of
English supporters became rowdy in a Belgian bar during a friendly
match against France.' Sawford spent the night in a Belgian jail cell,
but was released the next day without arrest.9'
Last summer, police in Brussels deported Sawford as he
attempted to board a plane for Euro 2000, and he appeared before an
English magistrate three days later.' Based in part on Sawford's
prior altercations, the magistrate imposed a four-year banning order
under the Football Act. Because local police arbitrarily determined
that Sawford fit the hooligan profile, the court essentially imposed an
additional penalty upon his prior conduct despite the fact that he had
avoided criminal prosecution for nearly three years.
ii. Insufficient Statutory Clarity
A statute that does not clearly describe the prohibited conduct
fails to afford the requisite degree of forseeability.94 David Savage, a
married thirty-two year old from Sheffield, was arrested for running
on the field after a goal by his team, Sheffield Wednesday.95 Savage
had moved from his seat when he noticed space nearer to the field; he
was involuntarily pushed on to the field after the goal, but then stayed
there to celebrate.' Savage did not know this was a criminal offence;
in fact, as one observer noted, "[h]e's been a Sheffield Wednesday fan
for thirty years and attends most matches sitting in the family
enclosure." '  The 2000 Act was passed between the time of this
88. See Sydney Young, Yobbo Gets Soccer Ban, MIRROR (London), Aug. 31,
2000, at 12.
89. See John Coles, Footy Yob is Banned from All Matches, SUN (London), Aug.
31, 2000.
90. Town Fan in World Ban, THIS IS WILTSHIRE, Aug. 31,2000.
91. Id.
92. Young, supra note 88, at 12.
93. Coles, supra note 89.
94. Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1641, 1626, T 26.
95. Olinka Koster, Three-Year Ban for Pitch Invaders, GRIMSBY EVENING




The Banishment of English Hooligans from Football Matches
offence and Savage's court hearing.' Consequently, the amended
Football Act enabled the Court to issue a three-year banning order,
in addition to the statutory fine prescribed for such conduct."
It is not entirely clear that Savage's innocuous behavior falls
within the ambit of hooliganism, or that the infraction of running on
the pitch deserves banishment from domestic and international
football matches. Such uncertainty suggests that the Football Act
may not be stated precisely enough to permit a desirable degree of
predictability."° In Erdogdu v. Turkey, the ECHR held that "crimes
of propaganda" were not precise enough to enable citizens to
distinguish between permissible and prohibited behavior.' The
Football Act implicates all crimes of "violence" or "disorder,"
language that is unnecessarily broad when retrospectively applied to
impose substantial punishment.'O°
iii. Altered Legal Consequences
Amarjit Samra insists he is a "scapegoat" for the trouble England
supporters cause throughout the international football community."-
Samra received a banning order from every football game in the
country for three years." The banning order made on a complaint
originated from an incident three years ago, in which Samra pleaded
guilty to being drunk while trying to enter a football ground." Samra
claimed he absolutely was not a hooligan, but only pleaded guilty
because it would have been too difficult to travel back and forth for
court proceedings. 6 Having never been involved in any acts of
violence, Samra believed the magistrates were determined to make an
example out of him the minute he entered the courtroom wearing an
English national team jersey.
Whereas Samra intended to plead guilty to public drunkenness
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Erdogdu v. Turkey, App. Nos. 25067/94, 25068/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=121214723
&Notice=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0 (last visited Jan. 21,2002).
101. Id. 57,59.
102. Graham, supra note 18, at 3.




107. Steve Webb, Soccer Fan Hands Passport to Police, THIS Is WILTSHIRE, Sept.
4, 2000.
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out of convenience and to facilitate closure to the court proceedings,
the decision ultimately led to the issuance of a banning order by
complaint. Had the 2000 Act existed at the time of Samra's initial
arrest, it is likely that it would have impacted his decision-making.
This retrospective application of the Football Act eliminated any
semblance of reasonable expectation of consequences.
IV. Could the Act Exist in the United States?
Both European and American jurisprudence share the principle
of law prohibiting ex post facto laws." Although the U.S.
Constitution and its interpretations are not binding on the ECHR,
decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court offer a thorough
analysis and interpretation of retrospective application of criminal
laws. Furthermore, as several other European countries have
instituted their version of the Football Act, it is not outside the realm
of possibilities that similar legislation could arise in the United States.
It is therefore relevant to consider the constitutionality of banning
orders issued by complaint.
A. Ex Post Facto Prohibition in the United States
The U.S. Constitution requires that "[n]o State shall.., pass
any... ex post facto law.""'° The constitutional protection is such that
Congress may not enact "any statute which punishes as a crime an act
previously committed.' ' . Essentially, the purpose of the ex post facto
prohibition is to "assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their
effect.., and [to] restrict[] governmental power by restraining
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.'
In the late eighteenth century, the Supreme Court held that ex
post facto constitutional protection applied only to penal statutes that
disadvantage the offender subjected to them."' In attempting to
refine the definition of "punitive" legislation, the Supreme Court
formulated a list of persuasive, though not comprehensive, factors: (1)
whether the sanction involves restraint; (2) whether the punishment is
excessive; (3) whether it has historically been viewed as a punishment;
108. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, with Convention, supra note 51, art.
7.1.
109. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
110. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925).
111. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,28-29 (1981) (citations omitted).
112. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,390-91 (1798).
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(4) whether there is a finding of scienter; or (5) whether the
traditional purpose of the statute coincided with traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence."' Still, many courts viewed
the Kennedy factors as helpful, but not dispositive."4 Unfortunately,
analysis was somewhat clouded by the Supreme Court's failure to
issue a "definitive answer" to the question of the meaning of
"punishment," or to articulate a "formula" for identifying
constitutionally prohibited legislation."5
The Court later clarified that the focus of the ex post facto
inquiry is not whether the defendant was "disadvantaged" by the
legislative change, but whether the change "alter[s] the definition of
an offence or increas[es] a punishment.,1 6 According to Collins v.
Youngblood, only legislation that: (1) makes an act criminal which
was innocent when performed, (2) imposes an additional punishment
on a previously convicted person, or (3) impacts the legal defenses
available to a defendant at the time the act was committed, violates
the ex post facto clause of the Constitution."7
B. The "Intents-Effects" Analysis
Collins ignored the list of potential factors identified in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez without overruling the decision, leaving courts
with multiple, although not entirely inconsistent, tests for defining
punitive legislation. Justice Stevens' concurrence in Collins stated
that an ex post facto application of law is one that substantially
deprives the defendant of his right to a fair trial and protections from
excessive punishment."8 Subsequent analysis focused first on the
purpose or intent of the statute, and then on the effect of the
legislation upon the defendant, to determine if the statute was
punitive."9
This "intent-effects" test became the definitive test of whether
legislation was punitive when it was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Ursery.Y Although the Court did not explicitly cite
the Kennedy factors in its opinion, the ultimate test consolidated
113. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168 (1963).
114. United States v. L.O. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,249 (1980).
115. People v. McVickers, 840 P.2d 955 (Cal. 1992).
116. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,49 (1990).
117. Id. at 52.
118. Id.
119. McVickers, 840 P.2d at 958-59.
120. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,288-90 (1996).
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many of the factors into the "effects" prong of the analysis . 2 1
Application of the intent-effects test to the Football Act shows
the football Act is an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it is
retrospective and imposes an additional punishment on a convicted
122person for a previous act.
1. Intent of the Act
In deciding whether a statute is penal, the Supreme Court begins
its analysis by examining the purpose of the statute.' 3  The
categorization of a particular provision as civil or criminal "is first of
all a question of statutory construction. 124 On its face, the Football
Act is a public safety law. Indeed, advocates of the Football Act
would argue that the sole intent of the legislature was to ensure public
safety, not to punish hooligans. That argument, however, can be
rebutted by examining the Football Act more closely. Banning
orders are triggered by criminal activity and protracted imprisonment
is levied for violation of its decree."z Thus, the Football Act's penal
purpose is evident.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the intent of the legislature
will be ignored if "the statutory scheme is so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention.1 26  Thus, the
effects of the statute must be examined as well as the intent.
2. Effect of the Act
In order to violate the Constitution's prohibitions on
retrospective legislation, the Football Act must increase punishment
for a previously committed act. 7 Thus, it is important to determine
whether the effect upon the detained hooligans is both retrospective
and punitive in nature. A law operates retrospectively when it
changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective
date. '2 Banning orders premised on a complaint implicitly violate this
principle of law by effectively levying additional punishment for prior
121. Id. at 290.
122. See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311,312 (1901).
123. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
124. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364,368 (1986)).
125. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14J.
126. United States v. L.O. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,249 (1980).
127. Cf. Convention, supra note 51, art. 7.1.
128. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 (1981).
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acts.129 In order to gauge whether the hypothetical existence of the
Football Act as American law increases the punishment for a prior
act, it may be helpful to consider analogous legislation.
C. Constitutionally Retrospective Legislation
The Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) allows the state to
impose an involuntary civil commitment after completion of a
criminal sentence upon a convicted felon with a history of
perpetrating violent sexual offences.3 ' The California Supreme Court
concluded the statute did not conflict with constitutional ex post facto
provisions when applied to a defendant whose most recent offence
occurred before enactment of the SVPA."' Although the court relied
on the legislative record in preserving the state's interest over the
individual's freedom, this result appears to be a clear example of a
retrospective increase in the time served for a violation that occurred
prior to enactment of the SVPA.
Consider also statutes that provide for increased punishment for
convicted felons found in possession of firearms. Although
possession of a firearm is a constitutionally protected right, valid
legislation restricts this privilege in the case of convicted felons."
The court stated that felony possession statutes do not prescribe
additional punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause.33 A
statute is not retrospective "merely because it draws upon facts
antecedent to its enactment."1" Instead, the court emphasized that
the governmental interest in protecting past and potential victims of
violent crime validates this particular restriction of personal freedom.
D. The Football Act and the Constitution
The aforementioned decisions of U.S. courts allowed
retrospective legislation despite the apparent ex post facto
implications. The distinction likely arises because of the importance
of criminal justice policies targeting violent sexual predators or felons
in possession of a firearm. It could be argued that the governmental
interest in restricting the right of "hooligans" to travel does not reach
129. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14C.
130. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584,587 (Cal. 1999).
131. Id. at 611.
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a similar intensity. Victims of hooligan violence and their families
probably would disagree strenuously. There are, however, other
distinctions as well.
The SVPA evidenced a decidedly proactive approach towards
violent sexual predators. Commentators have noted that the same
proactive approach characterizes the 2000 Act revisions of the
Football Act.'35  However, the legislation lengthening the civil
commitment of sexual offenders was a product of their statistically
recidivist behavior.'36 California Governor Pete Wilson proclaimed
that sex offenders have a 90% recidivism rate.'37 Such recidivism rates
are not paralleled among offenders who committed criminal offences
typical of "hooliganism. ''38  This statistical disparity in rates of
recidivism justifies allowance of retrospective increase in punishment
as to sexual offenders but not for other types of offenders.
Additionally, felon firearm possession statutes are
distinguishable from banning orders made on a complaint. Courts do
not classify felony possession statutes as retrospective application of
law. The crime for which the defendant is being punished is not the
earlier felony conviction, but "the new and separate crime of which
the prior felony conviction is only a constituent element.' '139 In fact,
this analysis closely parallels the rationale for upholding banning
orders made upon a conviction while at the same time invalidating
those imposed on a complaint. Although all exclusion orders punish
the violent tendencies of hooligans, banishment following a
conviction does not draw entirely upon the status of being a hooligan,
but rather aggregates the punishment for the concurrent conviction."4
For that reason, banning orders made on a conviction are analogous
to felon firearm statutes and do not involve the retrospective
application of law. Alternatively, banishment arising solely on the
basis of a complaint is based entirely upon the status of being a
hooligan and thus cannot be similarly justified by analogy to felony
135. Chaudhary, supra note 35, at 8.
136. Wendy Kaminer & Bob Edwards, Dealing with Sex Offenders (NPR radio
broadcast, July 27, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
137. Id.
138. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 74-75
(Steven Donziger ed., 1996). "A Justice Department study found that only 17.9 % of
state inmates are violent recidivist - that is, they are incarcerated for a violent offence
and had committed a prior violent offence." Id.
139. Venegas, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
140. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14A.
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possession statutes.
E. Is Hooliganism a 20th Century Social Disease?
Edward Grayson published an article entitled Sentencing Soccer
Hooligans shortly after Parliament passed the original Football Act in
1989."' Dubbing hooliganism a social disease comparable to drunk-
driving, Grayson insisted that the only cure to football-related
violence was a more stringent enforcement of the exclusion orders.142
According to Grayson, the enforcement should be similar to a
mandatory revocation of a driver's license for the infraction of driving
under the influence of alcohol: commit an act of violence at a match
and receive a banning order, in all instances.143 That analogy might be
acceptable. More importantly, the article evidenced the magnitude of
the social disturbance caused by football-related violence in the mind
of the commentator. After all, the legality of the Football Act
ultimately depends on the balance between the government's interest
in preserving public safety and countervailing civil rights of the
individual.
The comparison between hooliganism and drunken driving also
makes clear the conclusion that even the greatest threats to public
safety do not warrant limitless, retroactive application of punishment.
Grayson concludes his article by stating, "If there is any objection in
principle or practice to extending the draconian drink-driving [sic]
prohibition [to hooliganism] it will be of value and interest to know
why." " In response, one wonders how Grayson would comment on
the inverse question posed to him with respect to the invention of
banishment orders made solely on a complaint.
Grayson correctly states that the conviction of drunk drivers
frequently occurs because of "familiarity with and recognition of the
offender by local police."145  Local enforcement, such as random
drunk driving checkpoints, is an integral tool of law enforcement in
promoting public safety on the highways 6 Initially, this appears to





146. Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Stitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that
"the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving... and the degree
of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the
state program") (emphasis added).
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support the Act's empowerment of local authorities to detain known
hooligans before they travel to football matches. The rationale is
clear: the sooner authorities can identify potential culprits, the better
chance of averting harm. However, drivers are only punished if they
fail sobriety tests administered by police.
Alternatively, banning orders issued upon a complaint take this
rationale beyond constitutional constraints. An exclusion order
suspect need not be drunk at the time, nor committing any other act
of football-related violence. He may be merely preparing to board a
plane or a train to travel to a football match. And the authorities are
permitted to evaluate his past conduct in order to predict the
likelihood that he may contribute to violence or disorder in
connection with the match.47 Under the Football Act, authorities can
detain the suspect, and impose future detention, despite his lawful
behavior. One would have difficulty arguing that it is constitutional
to arrest a sober driver because his past behavior provides grounds to
believe detainment would help to prevent injury at some indefinite
point in his travels in the future.
V. Conclusion
If a suspect faces greater detriment under a banning order than
he was exposed to under the law at the time he committed the crime
for which he was convicted, he has received increased punishment.'
48
Fundamental freedoms and human rights carry great weight in
society, so competing governmental interests must be extremely
strong in order to infringe upon these rights. Public safety is
important, but that interest is sufficiently advanced by limiting
enforcement of the Football Act to banning orders resulting from
convictions. After all, those exclusion orders more accurately target
the actual perpetrators of violence. Anyone who witnesses the
catastrophes of football-related violence can comprehend the
legitimate and compelling interests of the government. Now, weigh
those interests against the numerous examples of the illegitimate
application of banning orders made on complaint, discussed above.
Banishment upon a complaint resembles adverse treatment on
the basis of status rather than conduct. Courts must remain cautious
in permitting retrospective punishment, as they have been with
legislation that restrains the freedom of sexually violent predators
147. Football Act, supra note 17, § 14A.
148. See Welch v. United Kingdom, 307 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14, 34 (1995).
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and restricts the constitutional rights of felons. Important factors to
consider in targeting a dangerous class might be the frequency and
magnitude of the threat posed to society. Hooligans have not yet
reached this infamous pedestal. They are a diverse population, not
easily targeted with invidious legislation as formulated by the 2000
Act amendment to the Football Act.
Therefore, it may be true to say that the government's interest in
prohibiting the travel of some hooligans is greater than its interest in
prohibiting the travel of others. Ultimately, banning orders made on
a complaint are undermined by this amorphous definition of a
"hooligan." The vague language of the Football Act perpetuates its
arbitrary and unconstitutional application. The multitude of criminal
acts that subject a person to banishment under the Football Act vary
tremendously in terms of degree of depravity.149 The indecisive
application of retrospective punishment weakens the government's
compelling interest and, outweighed by the need to protect the civil
rights of England's football hooligans, violates Article 7 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the ex post facto clause of the U.S.
Constitution.15
149. Football Act, supra note 17, sched. 1.
150. See Koster, supra note 95, at 2.

